I am a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Government of the University of Texas at Austin. My research agenda is motivated by the following question: How do footloose multinational corporations (MNCs) constrain or facilitate states' projection of power in the international system, with geopolitical tensions increasing in a globalized world? I unpack this question by looking at the state-business strategic interactions in the context of business compliance with economic sanctions. The enforcement of economic sanctions has become increasingly decentralized---private companies are entrusted with a greater role in policing sanction-related compliance matters in their daily business operations. I ask (1) How did private self-regulation emerge as the sanction enforcement regime it is today? and (2) What strategic incentives motivate private firms to go along with this private self-governance regime? And how do strategic interactions between businesses and governments explain firm-level compliance decisions? I use a combination of game-theoretic models, observational data, qualitative studies and audit experiments to address these questions in different projects.

I am a graduate fellow at the Innovations for Peace and Development Lab, heading the research team on tax incentive transparency in the US. I am also a graduate fellow at the Clements Center for National Security.

Prior to my academic career, I worked at China Policy, a macro-policy consultancy based in Beijing, as the lead macroeconomic analyst. I have also had professional experiences at the European Union Delegation to China, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, and the World Resource Institute. I obtained an M.A. in International Trade and Investment Policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and held a B.A. in English Language and Literature from the University of International Relations, China.