The U.S. enforcement of economic sanctions has far-reaching impacts on global business operations. While bringing only a small number of enforcement actions each year, the U.S. government sets off general deterrence that reshapes the conduct of firms it never touches. How do firms infer their own regulatory exposure from enforcement against other companies? Building on theories of heuristics under uncertainty, I argue that firms use shared sectoral membership and corporate nationality with penalized firms as markers of regulatory risk. Analyzing 19,996 cross-border acquisitions announced between 2016 and 2022, I find that each additional U.S. Treasury enforcement action in an acquirer’s sector during the preceding three years is associated with an approximately 3 percent lower completion hazard. Acquirers that share a penalized firm's nationality also face a lower completion hazard. These findings point to a firm-level mechanism of extraterritorial overcompliance and show how selective public enforcement expands the global reach of economic statecraft by deterring firms beyond those directly targeted and imposing procedural costs on cross-border transactions.